Positive economic development in association with transit investments such as light rail, bus rapid transit and streetcars is a common assumption in urban planning. However, the published literature on this relationship, primarily looking at light rail, shows varied outcomes, and studies on other modes such as BRT are very limited. This study reports economic development outcomes-defined as change in employment-for areas within one-quarter mile of three streetcar stations in each of four cities: Portland OR "Central Loop" line; Salt Lake City UT "S" line; Seattle WA "South Lake Union" line; and New Orleans LA "Rampart-St. Claude" line.
Introduction: The American Streetcar Renaissance
Prior to the opening of Portland, Oregon's North-South streetcar line in 2001, streetcars in North America were a novelty -a charming relic of a bygone era found only in a handful of cities, such as Philadelphia and San Francisco, which had not paved over their tracks decades ago. Less than a decade later, streetcars are popping up all over North America, with about a dozen in operation and many more in the planning stages. A major impetus for streetcar investments has been US federal funding: the Small Starts Program beginning in 2005 and the federal Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program, whose name indicates the philosophy behind it. Together, the programs support smaller-scale urban transit investments and economic development. The response from cities has been enthusiastic: it seemed for a time that a true streetcar renaissance was taking place that would reshape public transportation in American cities. More recently however, critical voices have grown louder, especially in the popular media, and the streetcar concept has come under greater scrutiny. In particular, the abrupt cancellation of two streetcar projects in Arlington, Virginia in late 2014 brought the debate to the fore. In essence, the debate rages between those who see streetcars as transit projects and those who see streetcars as economic development and/or urban revitalization investments. This dichotomy of perspective is more than nuance, for it is essentially what shut down the Arlington streetcar project and "…destroyed 15 years of a joint effort…It set back transit options in this part of the region for at least a generation or more" (1) .
Those in the anti-streetcar camp argue that as a way of moving people around, streetcars are excessively expensive and inefficient. They point out that streetcars are subject to getting stuck in traffic, do not move much faster than a person on foot or bicycle, yet require multimillion dollar infrastructure investments. The transportation needs of communities, they argue, would be better met by increasing bus service or by improving roads (2, 3) . In a recent comparative study, Brown, Nixon and Ramos (4) highlight the inefficiency of streetcars as a public transit mode compared with bus in terms of cost of operation, efficiency and speed of carrying passengers. There are, however, important differences among the five systems studied by Brown, Nixon and Ramos, with the Portland, Oregon system standing out in terms of its service and ridership performance. In their analysis, the authors conclude that the Portland streetcar system-held up as a model for modern streetcars as an economic development and urban revitalization tool-is in fact also the best-planned streetcar system among the five they studied from a transit planning perspective.
The pro-streetcar camp, on the other hand, argues that streetcars are not just transportation projects, although they do serve to meet some transportation needs. Rather, they are a highly visible investment in the community as a whole, and serve as a catalyst for economic development. A 2014 article in The Guardian speaks of the "emotional and aesthetic allure" of streetcars (5) and Brown, Nixon and Ramos (4) offer that streetcars "have now taken on an iconic role completely separate from any transportation function they possess." This project makes a comparative examination of the non-transportation effects -specifically, economic development -of recent streetcar projects in four US cities. This examination begins with a brief exploration of the connection between streetcars and economic development, using the example of the Portland North-South Line study. Given the lack of research on streetcars specifically, there is a brief review of studies on light rail, as the closest available rail-based analog.
Following this, the objectives and methodology of the project are reviewed and the economic effects of four streetcar projects in Portland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and New Orleans are analyzed sequentially. The paper concludes with an interpretation of the applications and implications of the results for understanding the relationship between streetcars and employment.
Streetcars and Economic Development
Because the modern streetcar is a relatively new phenomenon, very few comparative, objective studies exist on the linkage between streetcars and economic development. Many of the studies currently available are either single-city case studies (6, 7) , and/or non-peer-reviewed reports commissioned and published by interested parties (8) such as transit agencies that operate the streetcar. In order to place this study into context, two related literatures were examined. First, the economic impacts of related transit modes such as light rail (LRT) and bus rapid transit (BRT) were reviewed. Light rail is a potential analog to streetcar as it uses similar technology (rails and cars), thus providing a similar riding experience and level of reliability (widely considered to be more popular with the public than buses) and so may be expected to generate similar economic impacts. Second, a few case studies of modern streetcar systems currently available were analyzed.
Economic Development and Transit Investment
The relationship between economic aspects of land use and transportation investments is one of the most-researched topics in urban planning. Only a few recent perspectives on the topic are presented in this literature review so as to not be exhaustive. A 2009 commissioned paper for Smart Growth America lays out a series of economic arguments in favor of transit investments, including facilitation of economic growth through agglomeration economies, increased real estate values and enhanced connectivity between people and locations of economic opportunity 6 (9). Higgins and Kanaroglou (10) point out that it has become a widely accepted belief that investments in transit such as light rail generate positive economic outcomes -in particular, increases in land values in close proximity to stations. The authors provide a comprehensive review of four decades of research on the effects of rapid transit on land values. They found considerable variation across cities and even stations, and end with a constructive critique of the assumptions and methodology associated with this particular body of literature.
It is important to note that transit investments are not typically planned as a sole anticipated driver of economic development, however, but often as part of a policy package that also directs land use and facilitates desired change. Kolko surmised that, "The relationship between transit and surrounding land values and densities depends both on how businesses and residents value proximity to transit and on public-sector decisions about zoning, land use, and other incentives for transit-oriented development" (11) . As a case in point, a modeling study of projected streetcar impacts in Cincinnati found that impacts were spatially limited without accompanying policies to support economic development (12) . The economic development surrounding the studied lines in Portland, Seattle, Salt Lake City, and New Orleans have various supporting land use policies. The policies are noted within each case study.
Nelson et al (9) carried out a case study of the Eugene-Springfield, Oregon BRT system, finding enhanced growth in employment relative to the rest of the metropolitan area within 0.25 miles of BRT stations. This growth was not consistent across job sectors however, a finding that is supported by Belzer et al.'s (13) analysis of preferences of different employment sectors to locate near transit infrastructure. In contrast, Kolko examined 204 rail transit stations in California and found that growth in employment near stations was variable, with statistically significant decreases found in more stations than statistically significant increases (11).
The examples above indicate several recent contributions to an extensive literature that has been well-reviewed elsewhere and provide an entry into that literature. They make it clear that transit investment, counter to common assumptions in the field, does not automatically or directly lead to positive economic growth outcomes. However, while it is important to understand the broader context and longer history of research on transportation and economic development, it is also salient to question the applicability of studies on BRT and LRT systems on streetcars. LRT and BRT are different from streetcars in several ways that may be important.
As Brown et al (4) point out, streetcars are neither appropriately nor favorably compared with other transit modes in all cases.
The primary distinction between streetcars and LRT and BRT is speed; streetcars move in traffic at the speed of traffic, which as some critics note is often little faster than the speed of walking. Streetcars also stop more frequently than light rail, generally travel shorter distances and are less expensive to build and operate. As described by Hovee, "If light rail systems function as highways and arterials, streetcar systems function as the local streets" (8) .
Streetcar systems are small and local in scale, and while they may or may not connect to regional transportation infrastructure, they are currently applied in a rather limited set of circumstances, primarily in association with urban revitalization of downtown areas, either via a tourism or local commuter focus. Modern streetcars in the United States have not been viewed simply as transportation infrastructure but as part of an economic development strategy. Thus the degree, form and extent of economic development and redevelopment are directed by the preexisting built environment, the economic context of the downtown and the accompanying policies, zoning and incentives with regard to land use.
Where it all began: the Portland North-South Line
The recent streetcar renaissance in the U.S. has been strongly supported by federal funding programs, but it takes as its inspiration the single, shining example of Portland, Oregon's streetcar success story. If the Portland example has served as a model for potentially billions of dollars of investment nationwide in streetcar projects, it is worthwhile to take it as a starting point in this study. In addition, the Portland streetcar is essentially the only model for modern streetcar development at this time, so it is worthwhile to examine it.
The Portland North-South streetcar line opened in 2001 at a cost of $56.9 million, which, notably, was entirely locally funded. Its original length was 2.4 miles and it has since been extended to 4 miles, which makes it effectively 8 miles of track. The planning goals associated with the Portland streetcar (as listed at www.portlandstreetcar.org) were as follows:
• Link neighborhoods with a convenient and attractive transportation alternative.
• Fit the scale and traffic patterns of existing neighborhoods.
• Provide quality service to attract new transit ridership.
• Reduce short inner-city auto trips, parking demand, traffic congestion and air pollution.
• Encourage development of more housing & businesses in the Central City.
A report prepared by the Portland Office of Transportation and Portland Streetcar expressed this rationale and philosophy for the streetcar:
Like many other cities, Portland is growing in population and is proactively looking for ways to promote economic development while managing growth. Keeping Downtown Portland healthy is critical to the region's economic stability. The Portland Streetcar is at the heart of a new approach to shaping cities that promotes investment at the City's core, provides homes for people of diverse income groups and supports the urban amenities that make great cities great. (14) Hovee, in a report prepared for the Portland Office of Transportation, suggests that the Portland streetcar should actually be considered "development-oriented transit" (8) . The Portland business and real estate development community were strong backers of the original streetcar development and saw it as evidence of a commitment on the part of the city to downtown development.
The Economist, in a brief but scathing 2014 critique of streetcar investments, refers to "vague benefits" offered by streetcars that help to justify their cost. Hovee and Gustafson (7) helpfully eliminate this vagueness by listing six benefit metrics by which the Portland streetcar may be assessed:
• Density of new development (2) argues that the vast majority of development was highly subsidized and that subsidies were the primary driver of investment, however these arguments are countered by Bottoms et al. (15), who argue that the lower levels of development outside of the subsidy zones were due to the fact that that area was already largely built out and had much less development potential anyway.
Nelson et al (9) A further consideration with regard to the Portland streetcar is its effectiveness as a transit system. Despite the many arguments made that the streetcar was as much an economic development investment as it was a transit investment, Brown, Nixon and Ramos (4) show that Portland's system is by far the most effective of five streetcars studied (Portland, Memphis, Little Rock, Tampa and Seattle) as a transit mode, in terms of ridership, cost-effectiveness and favorable comparison with bus service. In other words, people in Portland actually use the streetcar to get around. This is in part because, thanks to the high density surrounding the streetcar route, 117,000 people live within 400 meters of a streetcar stop, double the density of the second-most dense city in the study, Memphis. It is also due to the fact that the Portland line is designed to provide public transit services to commuters, not just to tourists. Thus the frequency, hours of service, fares and connectivity to other transit modes and activity centers make it convenient and affordable.
Looking beyond Portland, there are few studies that allow for comparisons. Guthrie and A recent qualitative study by Ramos-Santiago, Brown and Nixon (16) examines the Little Rock, Arkansas and Tampa, Florida streetcars, and raises questions as to the economic and other benefits achieved by these two streetcars. While qualitative, this study does suggest these cities have not seen economic development associated with streetcars to the extent that Portland has; however, these lines are also more tourist-oriented and less supported by high-density populations, and the lack of a quantitative analysis of these systems makes it difficult to draw direct comparisons.
Study Objectives
This research addresses the question of whether streetcars do, in fact, promote economic development, measured here by employment. It is the first comparative study of employment patterns associated with modern streetcars in the United States, examining four modern streetcar systems that had completed construction and initiated service at the time of this study.
Methodology
Economic development may be assessed in various ways. In the literature on transportation and land use there are three common metrics. One approach measures economic development in terms of financial investment in real estate development (6), another as changes in real estate value (10) , and a third in terms of employment (9, 11) . It is difficult in any case to make a direct causal link between a transportation project and the real estate development metric; the relationship is generally inferred by examining spatial patterns and temporal trends in the data. A further challenge is presented in studies that compare more than one city, because local data associated with real estate development, building permits, etc., are collected and maintained locally and in different ways from one jurisdiction to the next. Thus no objective, comparative, multi-city studies of economic development associated with streetcar projects have been completed to date.
In order to avoid the challenges of obtaining comparable real estate investment data for all four cities in our study, employment was chosen to be the metric for economic development.
This metric has the advantage of being available nationwide in a common format (US Census).
However, it has the arguable disadvantage of being perhaps less responsive to streetcar development in the sense that real estate investment generally must occur first, in order for the employment to follow. For this reason, and because the streetcar lines in question are so new, this analysis can only lay the groundwork for detecting employment change for the new lines studied in this paper. The processes of change taking place may well be far from having run their course and only show small indications of things to come.
From a city planning perspective, forward-looking investments in public transit such as light rail are expected to increase density (residential and/or employment) near transit stations, as rail infrastructure is too expensive to cost-efficiently serve low density land uses. There are complications in studying the impacts of rail transit investment, however, because changes in density associated with rail transit projects may either reflect new, net economic growth occurring preferentially in those locations, or it may reflect spatial redistribution of pre-existing jobs. In addition, there is a chicken-or-egg dilemma in assessing economic impacts, as many transit investments are intentionally located to serve already-dense or growing population or job centers (see 11 for trends in California). That is, transit projects may be built specifically in locations that are already on a growth trajectory.
In this project, four streetcar systems were studied that were new streetcars, not "heritage" lines, carrying modern trains and developed primarily to serve transit functions for the local community rather than tourists. The four study systems were Portland, Oregon's Central Loop; Salt Lake City, Utah's S Line; Seattle, Washington's South Lake Union line; and New Orleans, Louisiana's Rampart-St. Claude Line. Changes in employment around focal streetcar stops were tracked over time against a set of comparable non-streetcar control sites, with the Central County as a whole 1 , and within economic groups. For each study system, a "before" year, specified as 3 years prior to the beginning of construction, and an "after" year, specified as 2013, being the most recent year for which data were available, were determined (see Appendix   1 We use central counties for our region because streetcar systems are designed to serve only the most centralized and built out area of the central county.
for dates). The before date was considered to reflect the date of the project funding announcement, since such an announcement might trigger real estate speculation, however since only employment is being studied, not real estate investment or land values, the date of three years prior to the construction start was considered sufficiently early as to represent a "before" condition. The after dates are the primary limitation of this study: service on two of these streetcar systems began so recently (Salt Lake City: 08 December 2013 2 ; New Orleans: 28
January 2013 3 ) that the most recent available data at the time of this study are less than one year after start of service.
Study locations and controls
For each streetcar line studied, three focal stops were selected to serve as pseudoexperimental "treatments". The primary selection criterion for streetcar stops was spacing, that they be far enough apart that quarter-mile buffers around each stop would not overlap significantly with one another and that they represent as much of the full length of the line as possible. Each treatment site consists of a quarter-mile radius walkshed centered on the selected stop. Guerra, Cervero and Tischer (17) find support for a quarter mile catchment as appropriate for employment-transit studies. Each walkshed had a different socioeconomic profile and in order to detect the effect of streetcar development, a set of control sites ("pseudo-stations") with similar profiles but without streetcars, were selected for comparison. A multidimensional similarity measure was used to select 10 control sites for comparison with each study stop; these control sites were located within the same metropolitan area, were served by existing bus routes, and shared similar socioeconomic characteristics in terms of population, employment, housing units, households, median household income as reported at the Census block group level prior to the streetcar project development's before date. A similar conceptual approach, with slightly different methodology, may be found in Kolko's analysis (11) . The process of selecting pseudo station areas consisted of two steps: first, creating a large set of candidate points, and second, assessing each candidate point for similarity with the actual streetcar locations. For the first step, it was assumed that bus service follows corridors that are similar to those considered by planners when designing streetcar alignments, and a large number of points (n=1000) randomly distributed along the network of arterial streets was created.
The second step used census measures of population, employment, housing units, households, and median household income at the Census block group level from the identified "before" year. These variables were chosen because of their availability at annual intervals going back to the earliest year considered in our study (2003 for the Seattle line) and their universal availability from US Census; the block group is dictated as the spatial unit of reporting as this is the finest unit for which the Census Bureau reports the median household income variable.
For each streetcar station (treatment) point and candidate control station point, values
were estimated for each of the five variables for the area within one-quarter mile of the point, allocating block group level measures proportionately to the fraction of the block group falling within this area. The distributions of the five measures were checked for normality and, if necessary, transformed to normalize them; individual measures were then standardized to zscores. Taking each streetcar station (treatment) point individually, the distance in the standardized 5-dimensional space was computed between the treatment point and each candidate control point. This distance is proportionate to dissimilarity, and the final ten control sites were selected starting with the smallest dissimilarity distances from each streetcar station (treatment) sites and rejecting candidates that overlapped in geographic space with already-selected control sites.
Descriptive Analysis
Each system was evaluated for the change in overall employment and employment in economic groups over the study periods. The streetcar station areas and the central county were compared, as well as pseudo station areas with the central county; in both cases using z-scores to test whether differences over time are statistically different from null. While we did not analyze the impact of planning policies associated with each streetcar project, these policies are listed in the Appendix.
Employment Analysis
With this study design, employment within each treatment walkshed is compared with itself over time (before-after), and with its respective set of control walksheds, also over time. In addition, as in the BRT study by Nelson et al (9) , shift-share analysis was used to examine employment trends at each of the study sites and controls. This approach looks at employment within each walkshed at the before and after dates, compared with broader trends in the central county as a whole, and within industry sectors in the central county, and allows the determination of changes in employment at each studied treatment or control site as attributable to broader trends within the central county (as a whole and/or within industry sectors) or as due to local factors at the study site. Nelson et al. (9) developed the shift-share approach for transitrelated economic development that was used in this study.
Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data from the US Census Bureau was used for the before and after years at the Census Block and Central County levels. LEHD economic sectors were combined into economic groups reflecting roughly comparable employment, land use, and building characteristics (see 18 for details). Economic sectors were not included for which workers do not occupy building spaces on a regular basis, such as farming, forestry, fishing, mining and construction.
Application and Results
The results are presented for each streetcar line in the following format: 1) overview of the system history and focal station areas; 2) employment change for the streetcar station areas and for the Central County as a whole with individual sector assessments; and 3) apportionment of shift-share results with respect to pseudo station areas and station areas. At the end of the section, the results are broadly summarized in Table 5 for comparative purposes. In addition, all four cities enacted zoning adjustments to facilitate development along the new streetcar corridors.
Although we did not analyze the impacts of these policies, they are listed for reference in the Appendix.
Portland, OR -Central Loop Line
The Portland Phase II streetcar system, known as the Loop, opened in 2012, although elements of the system, such as the Tilikum Crossing Bridge, were not operational until were all located along the "B Loop" and include these stations:
• Northeast Grand at Holladay
• Grand and Stark
• Southeast Grand and Hawthorne.
For brevity, results are reported for the combination of treatment and control sites. Table 1 reports descriptive results as well as shift-share results, focusing only on the control station area and streetcar station area effects. Discussion follows. 
Salt Lake City, UT -S Line
The S Line is the first modern streetcar line in Utah. It joins the main TRAX light rail system at its western end, and runs east for two miles through a dedicated right-of-way that previously carried freight rail, ending in Salt Lake City's "second downtown," the Sugar House The S Line is unique in several ways. In addition to running through an abandoned rail corridor instead of in a street, the project also includes a linear park and bike path that represents a critical linkage in the regional bicycle system. Moreover, the South Salt Lake Station is substantially surrounded by a park-and-ride lot serving the TRAX light rail system. With the exception of the Sugar House end of the line, the areas served by the S Line were not on a growth or redevelopment trajectory prior to the construction of the streetcar. Table 2 reports pooled descriptive and shift-share results for streetcar station areas and control areas, and for Salt Lake County as a whole. During the study period-extending from the depths of the Great Recession well into recovery-jobs increased by 25 percent in the control station areas but decreased by 2 percent in the streetcar station areas, both significant relative to the Salt Lake central county increase of 7 percent. Shift-share analysis further shows that by controlling for regional and industrial mix influences, the control station areas gained share of jobs while streetcar station areas lost share.
The control areas gained jobs in most economic groups, notably retail-lodging-food. In contrast, the streetcar station areas lost jobs in many more groups than they gained, though they did gain substantially more and statistically significant jobs in the office economic group.
When considered separately, there is no consistency among streetcar stations in Salt Lake with regard to employment sector dynamics. What growth there is at streetcar stations is driven primarily by growth at the Sugar House end of the line, although there is some office growth at South Salt Lake. The 500 E station area experienced a hemorrhaging of jobs over the study time period.
Short-term economic development outcomes of the S Line should not be surprising. Not only does the line not travel along a regular street but a key station (South Salt Lake) is mostly a park-and-ride lot. Much of the length of the line is also currently dominated by relatively lowdensity and low-to-moderate-income single-family housing that is unlikely to redevelop in the near future. This project was built opportunistically, with a view to the long-term infrastructure of the city, not as a local economic development stimulus. The economic growth that has occurred around the Sugar House terminus is in a regional center that was poised to take off regardless of the addition of a new rail-transit line.
Seattle, Washington -South Lake Union Streetcar
The South Lake Union Streetcar in Seattle started operation in 2007, connecting the South Lake Union neighborhood to downtown. The neighborhood was approved to be developed as a biotechnology and biomedical research center and those sectors contributed heavy funding for the streetcar. In 2010, Amazon built a new campus building in South Lake Union, which increased ridership considerably. The area is substantially developed into offices and other nonresidential uses though new high-density residential development has dominated new construction on parking lots and the redevelopment of older, low-rise structures. All of the development occurred after rezoning the area from industrial to land uses that would create a productive urban center. The effect of the change in policies was major redevelopment, economic growth, and a willingness on the part of developers to invest in projects around the streetcar line. The streetcar stations evaluated include the following:
• Westlake Hub What follows is a discussion of the key interpretations of Table 3 which reports descriptive and shift-share results.
Spanning 10 years, this line's before/after study period was the longest of the cases evaluated. Unlike Portland, the Seattle streetcar system has not been expanded beyond its small downtown footprint. As seen in Table 3 , it has also not performed well relative to the central county. During the study period,the control station areas increased jobs by 27 percent whereas King County's increased by 15 percent, and streetcar station areas actually lost one percent of jobs, mostly in the office sector group. Otherwise, statistically significant changes among economic groups around streetcar stations were positive. During much of the study period and especially since the Great Recession, residential development in downtown Seattle has outstripped office and other nonresidential development. Results shown in Table 3 confirm this.
The effect of residential development near streetcar stations should be the subject of future research.
Shift-share analysis shows that whereas control station areas gained share of jobs overall, streetcar station areas lost share. Indeed, streetcar station areas lost share of jobs in six of eight economic groups compared to just one for the control station areas. Health and ArtsEntertainment-Recreation appear to be the most consistent positive growth sectors for streetcar station areas but again, there is little consistency between locations. Katrina and then the Great Recession. Finally, it is in an area dominated by surface parking lots and older properties, prime for redevelopment. Table 4 reports economic development outcomes for the streetcar and control station areas. Table 4 shows that overall, the streetcar station areas outperformed Orleans Parish and the control areas, gaining jobs at 17 percent compared to the Parish at seven percent while the control areas lost three percent. Moreover, where the control areas lost jobs in six of the eight economic groups, the streetcar station areas lost jobs in just three. The shift-share results show further that the streetcar station areas gained share of central county jobs overall while the control areas lost job share.
Overall, relative to their matched controls, the streetcar station areas are all clearly more dynamic with regard to employment than control areas in New Orleans, however the dynamism does not follow consistent trends across station areas. The only consistent growth areas for streetcar station areas were Office and Retail-Lodging-Food. 
Interpretations and Implications
The primary outcome desired from these analyses is consistency in the response of employment to streetcars. Does each city streetcar line behave in an internally consistent manner, or is the difference between station areas greater than the difference between cities? If local employment effects are consistent among the sites within a single streetcar line, and in their differences with control sites, it is likely that there is a streetcar effect for that city. Of the other streetcars included in this study, it might be predicted that Seattle would be the most likely to follow the Portland model. Both are Pacific Northwest cities with similar culture and feel, although Seattle is much larger. Seattle's streetcar has also been in operation longer than any of the other lines considered in this study, second only to the original Portland line. However, this prediction was not borne out in analysis. Certainly, considerable investment in real estate redevelopment by major employers such as Amazon has occurred within and near the streetcar station areas, but job performance has been surprisingly weak, actually declining.
The Seattle example is lacking the internal consistency that was expected, showing patchy development along the streetcar line. However, it is also known from current ongoing work that whereas job production may be weak, residential development has dominated the streetcar station areas since the Great Recession.
The New Orleans streetcar was built within the unique context of recovery from Hurricane Katrina. As noted by Guthrie and Fan (6) , there has been significant commercial investment along the streetcar line during the post-Katrina years, but this has occurred within the context of strong investment and recovery activities citywide. New Orleans also has a long history of streetcars, making it more likely that investors will feel comfortable with streetcars as a valuable amenity. In fact, all three streetcar stations in this study showed positive employment growth and out-performed the control sites in both direct comparison and shift-share analysis.
Furthermore, it is evident that all of the streetcar sites in New Orleans are more dynamic than their matched controls. Can streetcar sites in New Orleans become the centers of focused development that we have seen in Portland? This is left to future research, but there is certainly strong potential.
The streetcar with perhaps the least internal consistency is the S Line serving the Sugar House area of Salt Lake City. The streetcar concept is new to Salt Lake City (although it had a streetcar network in the past), and the corridor through which the S Line runs is in the early stages of what will probably be decades of change. Wildly differing and rapidly changing employment numbers along the line indicate possibly several processes at work: relocation of jobs and activities along the corridor, vacating of older buildings and businesses in preparation for demolition, redevelopment, renovation, and simply very different uses of land and land densities at the different stops. Furthermore, the S Line does not run within a street, but through its own right of way that also supports a linear park, bike trail, and easy pedestrian movement. It is a novel and unique amenity, and it still remains to be seen how employment activities might orient themselves in relation to it. Among all streetcar lines studied and perhaps even all such lines nationally, the S Line's design may be the most unique, though also, potentially, least conducive to stimulating economic development.
Overall, Portland has continued to follow in its own footsteps as this analysis confirms previous observations of Portland's streetcar success story. All of the other cities lacked the consistency of Portland. As the literature review above showed, Portland's streetcar itself is only part of a mosaic of planning and development policies designed to reinforce streetcar use. Our policy inventory (Appendix) indicated that all four cities did implement zoning changes to facilitate development along the streetcar line. It seems likely that in the case of the newer systems, employment development will follow, eventually, as there is evidence of employment change occurring. Portland may have been in a better position to develop quickly, based on its recent experience with the earlier streetcar line. Our study also did not have a way to gauge the degree of buy-in on the part of the local business community and the dynamics of public-private sector relationships in each city. A final point is that despite the short distance between streetcar stations, from the perspective of supporting business development and therefore employment growth, a streetcar line does not behave as a corridor but as a series of discrete points associated with individual station areas.
